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cross the border of proper regulation into the field of free speech.
While the right of free speech is not absolute, any restriction of the
right must not be substantial, and must be aimed at the correction
of a definite evil which Congress believes to be imminent. 6 It is not
for the court to say whether Congress acted wisely, but merely
whether it has the power so to act.7 Where a statute is reasonably
susceptible of two interpretations, the court must adopt that construc-
tion which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity.8 In
determining the constitutionality of this statute when such issue is
squarely presented, the questions to be decided will be: (1) is the
new phraseology expansive, (2) does it substantially abridge freedom
of speech, and (3) is it reasonable?
J. F. W.
EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIzuRE NOT VALID
WHERE SEARCH WARRANT COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED.-In Jan-
uary, 1946, agents of the Alcoholic Tax Unit of the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue were informed by one Kell that petitioners were
seeking to lease a part of his farm with the intention of erecting a
building thereon and that he suspected their purpose was to build
and operate an illegal still. The federal agents instructed Kell to
accept the proposition and assigned one of their men to work on the
farm in the disguise of a farm hand. This agent kept the Government
currently informed as to every detail of petitioners' activities during
the month prior to the arrest. When federal agents approached the
premises, they observed, through an open door, petitioner Antoniole
apparently in the process of operating the still and immediately en-
tered and arrested him, The agents then proceeded to seize the
equipment and all other tangible evidence of the illegal distillery.
The agents had neither a search warrant nor warrants of arrest.
Petitioners were charged with various violations arising out of their
ownership and operation of the distillery, but before being indicted
made a motion to exclude and suppress the evidence secured by the
agents, alleging that it had been obtained by an illegal seizure. The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third District af-
firmed an order of the District Court of the United States for the
District of New Jersey denying this motion. Held, reversed on the
ground that since there was ample opportunity to obtain a search
warrant and no need for summary seizure, the search was not jus-
5 Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N. E. 2d
115 (1946).
6 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095 (1927).
" United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 91 L. ed.
754 (1947).
8 United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407, 408, 53 L. ed.
836, 848, 849 (1909).
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RECENT DECISIONS
tifiable as an incident of legal arrest. Trupiano v. United States,
- U. S. -, 92 L. ed. 1198 (1948).1
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court conceded that Antoniole
had been validly arrested, recognizing the well established rule that
law enforcement officers have a right to arrest without a warrant for
a felony committed in their presence.2  The Court stated that the
validity of such an arrest is not obliterated by the mere fact that there
was sufficient time to procure a warrant of arrest. An entirely dif-
ferent conclusion was reached with regard to. seaich warrants. The
Court did not adhere to the principle laid down by a long line of cases
that when a valid arrest has been made, the arresting officer has the
right to seize all evidence of crime 8 within sight,4 but instead re-
stricted that right to situations where there has not been ample time
to obtain a search warrant. Since the federal agents had been fully
aware of petitioners' illegal activities for several months prior to the
raid, the Court felt that they had had more than ample opportunity
to procure a search warrant. In Harris v. United States,5 decided
one year earlier, the Court held that when a man has been validly
arrested in his home, the arresting officers may search his entire
home, even though without a search warrant, provided -that the scope
of their search does not extend beyond that required for the object
being sought. Any article ordinarily subject to seizure 6 could be
seized and made the basis of a charge against the person arrested,
even though it was not the object originally sought and even though
those conducting the search had not the slightest notion that the
person arrested possessed the same.7 The practical result of this
case was to make an arrest in one's home far more effective than a
search warrant, and thereby diminished the protection that a man's
home had previously afforded him. The decision was met with a
storm of disapproval and several groups even went so far as to peti-
tion the Supreme Court to reverse itself.8 Nor were the writers of
legal literature lax in adding their criticism.9 Despite these protesta-
" Reversing in, part 163 F. Zd 828 (C. C. A. 3d 1947). Petitioners had
also moved to have the evidence returned to them and the judgment denying
this motion was affirmed in this decision.
2 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156, 157, 69 L. ed. 543, 552,
553 (1925).
3 Such evidence is generally limited to instrumentalities of crime, contra-
band materials, weapons and fruits of crime.
4 Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 150, 151, 91 L. ed. 1399, 1405,
1406 (1947), and cases cited in note 12 therein.
5 331 U. S. 145, 91 L. ed. 1399 (1947).
8 See note 3 supra.
7 Formerly, a search made in connection with an arrest was limited to the
person of the one arrested and objects that were visible and accessible and
within his immediate custody. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452,
76 L. ed. 877 (1932) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344,
75 L. ed. 374 (1931).
8 DEssIoN, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER 263
n. a (1948).
9 Kizer, The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution-The Harris
19481]
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tions, it could hardly have been expected that there would be any
immediate change in the policy of the Supreme Court. Yet, this is
precisely the result brought about by the instant case. Though de-
clining to comment on what effect its ruling would have on the Harris
decision and pointing out that the circumstances were different in
that case, the Court nevertheless stated that when there again arose
a situation similar to the one that existed in the Harris case it would
have to be tested by the present ruling that "search warrants are to
be obtained and used wherever reasonably practicable." 10 While the
Harris decision has not been overruled, it has, in effect, been greatly
modified. A valid arrest in one's home will no longer entitle the
arresting officer to make a search of the home; now it must also be
shown that no opportunity existed to obtain a search warrant. The
Court established a new principle of law and in so doing was com-
pelled to go well out of its way to avoid the precedent of prior de-
cisions. Four cases were cited as a basis for the proposition that law
enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever
reasonably practicable."' However, not one of these cases involved a
situation where visible and accessible articles immediately in the cus-
tody of the offender had been seized pursuant to a valid arrest and
for that reason they are completely distinguishable from the present
case. The Court stated that what would have been an illegal seizure
should not be made legal by the fortuitous circumstance of discover-
ing some one in the act of committing a felony.
It is believed that this decision falls well within the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Consfitution 12 in protecting
individuals against unreasonable search, and that the Court was jus-
tified in veering from the course pointed out by the Harris decision.
While this decision may afford an avenue of escape for those guilty
of crime it must be remembered that whenever such a result is brought
about, it is due entirely to the negligence of the Government officials
in failing to obtain a search warrant. In the absence of such negli-
gence, there can be no harm. In any event, it is better to be over-
zealous in protecting the individual's right to privacy than to go to
the other extreme and to allow it to be invaded and partially destroyed
by decisions such as the one in the Harris case.
T. A. B.
Case, 7 LAW. GuIim REv. 122 (1947); Lunderman, Constitutional Law-Search
and Seizure, 5 NAT. B. J. 343 (1947); 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 186 (1948);
36 ILL. B. J. 140 (1947); 22 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 167 (1947).
30- U. S. -, 92 L. ed. at 1204.
"I Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 92 L. ed. 323 (1948) ; Taylor v.
United States, 286 U. S. 1, 76 L. ed. 951 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 344, 75 L. ed. 374 (1931) ; Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543 (1925).
12 U. S. CONsT. AMEND. IV provides: "The right of the people to be
secure . . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized."
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